: War is ugly--Afghan War Worse ala R.Kidd (West Point

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From: "George W Kenning Jr", INTERNET:gkenning@compuserve.com

To:   "Rosa", KATEALEXANDER

      "John McHale", jmchale5

     

Date: 9/29/101  3:08 PM

 

RE:   Fw: War is ugly--Afghan War Worse ala R.Kidd (West Point)

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: "PGP_JCP" <PGP_JCP@compuserve.com>

To: "Paige Gordon" <gordonp@pcci.com>; "Milt Bearden"

<milt.bearden@home.com>; "Jim Campbell" <jec7002@aol.com>; "Jack McNealy"

<jmcnealy@juno.com>; "Holger JENSEN" <hjens@aol.com>; "George W Kenning"

<GKenning@compuserve.com>; "Karl -ACC" <Karl@accusa.com>

Sent: Friday, September 28, 2001 8:29 PM

Subject: War is ugly--Afghan War Worse ala R.Kidd (West Point)

 

 

>

> Message text written by Paige Gordon

> >Sender: gordonp@pcci.com

> From: Paige Gordon <gordonp@pcci.com>

> Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2001 17:55:27 -0400

> To: pgp_jcp@compuserve.com

> Subject: war is ugly

> Pretty tough roe to hoe - if he is right.  I hope we still have the

stomach

> for it - we used to.

>

> Bill

>

>  -----Original Message-----

> From:   taylor.bob@sfwspac.lemoore.navy.mil

> Sent:   Thursday, September 27, 2001 1:11 PM

> Subject:        Must read

>

> Wow... This is a rather long piece, but worth hanging in there. Something

> every American should read... It's in the NEED-TO-KNOW category. Ahhhh,

> make

> that MUST-KNOW category. This is a VERY tough read, even disturbing, but

> worth reading for many

> reasons. If anyone wants to know why we are being so slow to attack, this

> may give you an idea. For those who have not been to war - the crowds

cheer

> and the bugles blow for vengence, but when the dogs of war are unleashed

> the

> laws of unintended consequences take over. We must not fear to do what we

> must, but we must be very wise in deciding what that is and when to do

it -

> Shep: Don & Ty,

>

> This was written by a West Point grad to members of his class. He spent a

> lot of time in Afghanistan and has some very definite ideas about how we

> should address the challenge over there. Lets hope that someone in the

> Pentagon and State Dept. factors this into the planning process.

> You might  give this a boost into the right intellectual areas.

>

> Dave Dear Classmates: Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of

> the last American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in

> Afghanistan. I was first there in 1993 providing relief and assistance to

> refugees along the Tajik border and in this capacity have traveled all

> along the border region between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was

> the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in

Afghanistan.

> This program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over

> 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was

> somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as decreed by the Taliban,

> against the evil of land mines, and by a special proclamation of Mullah

> Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were considered to

> "martyrs" even an "infidel" like myself.

>

> The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the country

> and because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively, without

> too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in

> the area and among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the

> subject. I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives,

> but quite frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and

> have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would

like

> to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.

>

> First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and

> character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some

> comments about our "enemy." Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan.

The

> country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast

majority

> of the people live day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of

> poverty, misery and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate,

the

> women even less. The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something

> like peace. They know very little of the world at large, and have no

access

> to information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by

> the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing that is except for their

> pride. Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often

> referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious

> leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent

> came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the

> Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our

> own government.

>

> OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time)

> restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the

> Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time this

> military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his

> "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is

the

> "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards protect senior

> Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban,

> which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he

> learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of

> Kandahar. This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the

> last 2 years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the

> part of the local Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban

> regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local

> humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have

> become even harsher. It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer

> support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult

> time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more

> on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL.

>

> OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action were probably on their way to

> sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have

> experienced in Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment. During the Afghan war

> with the Soviets much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the

> Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time and most of us had

> high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the

> brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets. Those

> concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as

a

> nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that

> makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and

> clouded by cultural constraints that no matter what, a warrior should

never

> lose his honor. Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful

> (but still done). Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal

> in nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person

> owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is

> secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this

> somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are

> being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along

> ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept of having a place of "honor"

> and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families

> and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight.

That

> is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians.

> It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of

> Afghans into a military formation.

>

> The "real" stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are

> very enlightening and a lot different from our fantastic visions as

cadets.

> When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen

> group, another group-supposedly on the same side, attacked the first group

> and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but

> because having them was a matter of prestige. Many larger coordinated

> attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan

> fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or

> overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to seek

glory.

> In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of

> fatalities were lower for all involved.

> As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not

> THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so

> than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It

goes

> back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their history the only events

> that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the

> desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this the Afghans have been

> fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to

endure

> hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate

> the resolve of all but the most elite military units. The physical

> difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather and the

> harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and

> use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair

> generals--around November 1st most road movement is impossible, in part

> because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air

> movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not

> afraid to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the

> stomach for a fight. Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of

> 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards, who would not

> risk one life in face to face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might

> and acting as a deterrent, that action and others of the not so recent

> past, have reinforced the perception that the US does not have any "will"

> and that were are morally and spiritually corrupt. Our challenge is to

play

> to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their propensity for internal

> struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs and the majority of

> Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles and their lack

> of external support. More importantly though is that we have to take steps

> not to play to their strengths, which would be to unite the entire

> population against us by increasing their suffering or killing innocents,

> to get bogged down trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of

> attrition chasing up and down mountain valleys. I have been asked how I

> would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond my pay grade

or

> expertise. And while I do not want to second guess current plans or start

> an academic debate I would share the following from what I know about

> Afghanistan and the Afghans.

>

> First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they

> can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with

> this cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership

> making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing

> discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets,

> but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its

> legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans. Fourth would be to give massive

> amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in

> order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live

> rather than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the

> "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the

> country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press

> reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with

> peace. Sixth, I would consider vary [very] carefully putting any female

> service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our class

> but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for him has zero

> respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan

allies.

> No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women. I would hold off

from

> doing anything too dramatic in the near term, keeping a low level of

covert

> action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force

> open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing. Expect

> that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick up the

> pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do "pick-up" the pieces I

> would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man." While I would

> never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential that we

> communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage

and

> destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try

> to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are

> essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in

> the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing

> will communicate this except for ground combat. And once this is all over,

> unlike in 1989 the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance

> to rebuild the country.

>

> While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to

> share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not

> abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there

is

> a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner

> exchange. During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of

> communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a

> "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to

> take home with them. This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia

> and Chechnya w[h]ere similar videos are being made today and can be found

> on the web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated

> the same way. Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of

> US prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only

> to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us

to

> overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations and to

> turn this into the world wide religious war that they desperately want.

> This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further

> collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling). This will not

> be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat

> conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our enemies, we must

> show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our military

> character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must

> show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do

> this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for

> shrewd military logic. For anyone who is still reading this way to long

> note, thanks for your patience. I will try to answer any questions that

may

> arise in a more concise manner.

>

> Thanks, Richard Kidd

>

>

 

 

 

 

 

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From: "George W Kenning Jr" <gkenning@compuserve.com>

To: "Rosa" <KATEALEXANDER@compuserve.com>,

        "John McHale" <jmchale5@compuserve.com>

Subject: Fw: War is ugly--Afghan War Worse ala R.Kidd (West Point)

Date: Sat, 29 Sep 2001 13:16:32 -0600